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Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Industrial Development Financing
1. INTRODUCTION

A.

The Stages of Economic Growth

The economic growth and industrial expansion of the United States
has been both dramatic and pervasive. Within the period of a single century the United States experienced a metamorphosis from a traditional
society to a society of high mass consumption.' Aided by the industrial
revolution, the United States achieved the pre-conditions for economic
"takeoff' 2 during the middle of the nineteenth century and began its
transition from a predominantly agricultural to a highly industrialized
society. This transition encompassed the economic, social, and political
structures of the various sectors of the country and involved the accumulation, mobilization, and outlay of capital,3 the development of productive investments having a high growth rate, the emergence of dynamic
political and social leadership, and an orientation toward national and
international commerce.4 This transitional period-encompassing the
pre-conditions for take-off, take-off, and the drive to economic
maturity'-lasted until the early part of the twentieth century, when
economic maturity was achieved and a period of steady, but rapid,
economic growth was experienced.
B.

The HistoricalContext

The emergence of industry as the energizing force behind economic
expansion in the United States created a healthy appetite for capital. In
the colonial period the major sources of capital were land and
commerce, 6 necessitating a reliance on agriculture as a supplier of the
funds required to finance the industrial activities of the colonies.
Colonial governments also responded by providing direct financial
assistance to selected manufacturers in the form of bounties, premiums,
I. W. W. Rostow identifies five stages of economic growth: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to economic maturity, and the age of high mass
consumption. W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 (1960). The transition in the
United States was achieved primarily in the period from 1840 to.1920. Id. at xii.

2.

Rostow describes "take-off" as a period of substantial economic growth, compound

interest, and rapid industrial expansion. Id. at 6-9, 57.
3. Id. at 24-25.
4. Id. at 18-19,39.
5. The drive to maturity is characterized by Rostow as "the period when a society has
effectively applied the range of then modern technology to the bulk of its resources." Id. at 59.
6. G. SOULE & V. CAROSSO, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 130 (1957).
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and subsidies.' However, the pressing need to develop transportation
systems and other "social overhead capital,"' coupled with the
techniques of mass production introduced by Eli Whitney in 1799,1
required the accumulation and mobilization of large sums of capital.
Thus, it became necessary to divert funds in excess of consumption levels
into the control .of individuals and organizations which would utilize
such capital to develop the needed systems and facilities.,' Three main
methods emerged as means of securing this capital: (1) the introduction
and use of the corporate form of doing business; (2) the encouragement
of foreign investment; and (3) governmental financial assistance." With
the exception of foreign investment, however, the primary sources of
capital still remained land and commerce. Consequently, an
agriculturally-oriented commerce provided the financial support for the
industrial take-off of the United States. This take-off was achieved
largely through the use of the corporation, which diverted necessary
funds into the control of those investing in primary growth sectors. 2
However, in certain areas, private mobilization of capital proved to be
inadequate, and it became necessary for government to lend its financial
assistance. This was apparent in public expenditures for transportation,
since the capital expended in constructing transportation systems was
unlikely to yield quick financial returns to private investors." Railroads,
particularly those built in sparsely settled regions, could not expect
initially to achieve financial success. Consequently, such railroads
sought and received financial assistance in the form of state and local
governmental subscriptions for railroad bonds or stock, 4 governmental
7. E.g., Virginia, in 1662, granted a tobacco bounty of five pounds for each yard of woolen
cloth. Maryland, in 1719, offered'100 acres of land to any citizen establishing iron furnaces and
forges in Maryland. E. HAWK, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 105 (1934). See generally
Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and
EconomicApproach, Ill U. PA. L. REv. 265,266 n.4 (1963)..

8. Such social overhead capital would include roads, canals, schools, and communications
systems. See W. ROSTOW, supra note i, at 19.
9. G. SOULE & V. CAROSSO, supra note 6, at 114.
10. SeeW. RosTow, supra note 1,at 19.
11. See C. WRIGHT, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 312 (2d ed. 1949).
12. Rostow groups the sectors of an economy into three categories: primary growth sectors,
supplementary growth sectors, and derived-growth sectors. The primary growth sectors are "where

possibilities for innovation or for the exploitation of newly profitable or hitherto unexplored
resources yield a high growth-rate and set in motion expansionary forces elsewhere in the economy."

The other two sectors derive their growth in varying degrees from the primary sectors. W. RosTow,
supranote 1, at 52.
13. One of the characteristics of capital invested in transportation or social overhead capital
is a long period of gestation. Additionally, such investment is likely to pay off indirectly, as by
inducing economic growth in a supplementary or derived-growth sector. Id. at 25.
14. E.g., Ohio, in 1937, promised that state subscriptions to railroad stock would equal one-
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loans,' 5 and land grants.' 6 Similar assistance was made available to select
development in
industries through tax concessions designed to encourage
7
anticipated.'
not
were
profits
areas in which immediate
The early financial assistance to the railroads resulted in liberal
extensions of credit and heavy stock subscription commitments by state
and local governmental units. When this activity was challenged in the
courts on grounds that the public taxing power was being used to assist
private interests, most courts initially upheld the legality of the
expenditures on the theory that the ancillary benefits accruing to the
respective communities promoted a public purpose. 8 The courts began
to scrutinize these financial assistance programs, however, when abuses,
improprieties, and outright frauds-which had serious, if not disastrous,
consequences upon the credit of the governmental units involved-began
to occur.' 9 In repudiating these abuses, some courts held that such
financial assistance did not come within the ambit of the public purpose
doctrine."0 Also in response to these abuses, a trend manifested by a
growing wariness of government to assist railroads began to develop,
which culminated in the formulation of state constitutional safeguards
designed to protect state governmental units from the undesirable effects
of the railroad financing ventures. Governmental power to engage in this
type of economic activity was greatly restricted. 2' These constitutional
provisions, written during a period of economic expansion and take-off,
half of the private subscriptions. Virginia purchased three-fifths of the stock of several railroads and
guaranteed the bonds of others. C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 281.
15. E.g., New York loaned over $6 million to the New York and Erie Railroad to build a line
from New York City to Lake Erie through the southern counties of New York. Id.
16. Land grants were of federal origin. However, in order to avoid constitutional problems,
land grants were made to the states which then made them to the railroads. The railroads, in turn,
utilized the land to obtain the necessary funds. Id.
17. Historically, tax exemption legislation with respect to industry has been associated
primarily with war periods. Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United
States, 18 MINN. L. REv. 411, 417 (1934).
18. Note, State ConstitutionalLimitationson a Municipality'sPower to Appropriate Funds
or Extend Creditto Individualsand Associations, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 95, 97 (1959).
19. E.g., People ex rel. Detroit & H.R.R. v. Township Bd., 20 Mich. 452 (1870) suggested the
potential danger of powerful interest groups exerting influence on financial assistance legislation.
See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 18, at 97-98. One example of fraud occurred in the South
during reconstruction. Carpetbaggers, financed by Wall Street, bought up the stocks of southern
railroads. Members of state legislatures, who had been bribed, voted millions in financial assistance,
ostensibly to help reconstruct the damaged railroads. Most of this money found its way into the
pockets of the legislators and the carpetbaggers. E. HAWK, supra note 7, at 490.
20. E.g., People ex rel. Detroit & H.R.R. v. Township Bd., 20 Mich. 452 (1870) (no difference
discernible between railroads and other private business).
21. Note, supra note 18, at 98. See generally Note, County Subscriptions to Railroad
Corporations, II AM. L. REGISTER 737 (1872).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[\Io .. 21

form much of the basis for the opposition to industrial financial
assistance in the present period of economic maturity and high mass
consumption.
C. Economic Development Factors

The preconditions for take-off, the transitional period, and the
realization of economic maturity were not achieved uniformly
throughout the country. Even in a mature economy of generally high
mass consumption regional economic take-off is dependent upon the
growth rate of the particular sector of the economy present in the region.
One leading economist notes that the momentum of economic growth
"is maintained as the result of rapid expansion in a limited number of
primary sectors, whose expansion has significant external economic and
other secondary effects."" Thus, certain regions of the country are likely
to lag behind the economic development of the nation as a whole if their
economic bases are not oriented to the then leading primary growth
sectors.
Under the economic base theory of regional development it is
essential for a growing region to export goods and services to other
regions in order to receive "outside" money for use in local
development." Consequently, "basic" industries which sell to individuals
and firms outside of the region provide the real basis of regional
economic growth2 by causing, either directly or indirectly, related
growth in response to their own activity. Such response is likely to be in
the form of an impetus given to "service" industries whose output or
services are consumed within the region 2 by the basic industries, their
employees, and other service industries. The economic base theory also
suggests a correlation between employment in basic industries and
employment in service industries. Through the use of empirically derived
"regional employment multipliers ' 26 reasonably reliable predictions can
22.

W. ROSTOW, supra note 1, at 53. Rostow further states that "the behavior of sectors

during the take-off is merely a special version of the growth process in general; or, put another way,

growth proceeds by repeating endlessly, in different patterns, with different leading sectors, the
experience of the take-off." Id.
23. WEISS & GOODING,

ESTIMATION OF DIFFERENTIAL EMPLOYMENT

MULTIPLIERS IN A

SMALL REGIONAL ECONOMY, RESEARCH REPORT TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, No.

37, Nov. 1966, at 8.
24. Id. at 2. See also W. ROSTOW, supra note 1, at 52.
25. Service industries include: retailing, local government, local utilities, construction,
professional and business services. WEISS & GOODING,supra note 23, at 8.
26. The economic base theory assumes that there is a stable relationship between basic
employment and service employment. The sum of the two types of employment equals the total
regional employment. For example, if empirical data suggests that 100 new basic jobs would bring

NOTES

1968]

be made of the short-range impact on total employment caused by
changes in basic industry employment." Thus it can be concluded that
the most effective means of developing lagging regional economies is to
invest in the basic industries of the region which are involved in the
primary growth sectors. This type of investment should induce activity
in supplementary and derived-growth sectors and, thus, create
employment opportunities beyond those directly associated with the
investment.
D.

Economic Stimulation Factors

Before a plan of economic stimulation through financial assistance
to industry is devised, the primary and secondary objectives sought
through the stimulation process must be clarified. In addition to the
primary objective of achieving regional pre-conditions for take-off
through the promotion of basic industries, several corollary objectives
may be sought. Perhaps the most important of these is the alleviation of
unemployment and underemployment. To a large degree such alleviation
automatically follows basic industry stimulation due to the effects of the
regional employment multiplier. However, once the local labor force is
fully employed at a given average wage rate, any increase in that wage
rate (through minimum wage legislation or otherwise) results in a
corresponding reduction in the employment level of the local labor force.
Theoretically, if a subsidy of some kind equal to the wage rate increase is
received by local industry and is wholly applied to reduce labor cost, the
local labor force should return to its former full employment level.28
Other secondary objectives of economic stimulation include the
acceleration of market adjustments (by assisting industries which will
utilize locally available raw materials) and the increase of competition
(by helping industry to overcome high fixed costs, by reducing the
element of risk in the calculation of profits, or by providing industry
with extra liquidity).29 Secondary objectives of economic stimulation
in 200 new service jobs, total employment would be increased by 300. The regional employment
multiplier would be 3.0. The multiplier is not the same for all regions. Id. at 2.
27. Id. Some criticism of the use of regional employment multipliers has been voiced on the
grounds that service employment may actually grow independently of basic employment for a
variety of reasons. See id. at 3.
28. For a graphic description of this theoretical employment model under perfect competition
conditions, see Cumberland & Van Beek, Regional Economic Development Objectives and
Subsidization of Local Industry, 43 LAND EcON. 253, 255 (Aug. 1967). For a similar presentation
of the full-employment equilibrium condition using the Keynes model, see L. KLEIN, THE
KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION 82 (1947).
29. Laird & Rinehart, Neglected Aspects of IndustrialSociety, 43 LAND EcON. 25, 31 (Feb.
1967).
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indirectly related to economic growth include the rejuvenation of slum
areas 30 and the inducement of additional industrial development in
3
selected auxiliary industries. '
Once the primary and secondary economic objectives are
formulated with a view toward the effective utilization of infused capital,
it becomes necessary for economic planners to consider carefully a
number of locally induced effects of economic stimulation. Foremost in
this area is the effect of added population on local facilities. As basic
industry is developed in an underdeveloped area, labor and management
personnel will immigrate to the area in response to the needs of both the
new basic industries and the increased demands on the service industries.
Such immigration could tax the capacity of existing facilities in housing,
sanitation, education, police and fire protection, recreation, and
transportation.32 The effective solution of problems such as disposal of
industrial wastes, pollution, congestion, and noise control could require
large capital outlays from both public and private sectors. Thus,
increased demands on the public sector could place severe strains on
inelastic revenue sources if the incoming industries fail to employ locally
taxable factors of production while utilizing a wide range of public
services.3 3 In order to avoid serious tax distortions, a re-examination of
the local tax system with a view toward taxing the potential users of the
additional services may be required. 4 In addition to the economic effects
of stimulation, significant psychological tensions may develop in a
rapidly expanding community. This could occur if a substantial
disparity between the average income level of the immigrating labor
force and the local per capita income developed, or if the new industries
tended to dominate the political and social structure of the community.3"
30. Municipal Bond Dealers Rebut IBA Committee on Industrial Aid Bonds, The
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Aug. 11, 1966, at 12, col. 1. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1959, at
1,col. 7, for the proposal that an industrial development plan be combined with a slum clearance
program.
31. Laird & Rinehart, supra note 29, at 30.
32. Note, The "'Public Purpose" of Municipal Financingfor Industrial Development, 70
YALE L.J. 789, 802 (1961). See also Cumberland & Van Beck, supra note 28, at 260-61.
33. Id. at 260.
34. Id. at 261. It could result that if the tax systems are not restructured, persons and
property located in one area will be heavily taxed to support various facilities and services in
another. See Walker, FiscalConsiderationsInvolved in Patternsof IndustrialDevelopment, 31 TAx
POLICY 3 (March 1964).
35. Cumberland & Van Beck, supra note 28, at 261.
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II.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCING PLANS

A.

History

The history of public industrial financing at the state and local
levels began with the early subsidies, bounties, and premiums paid by the
colonies to selected manufacturers to encourage the production of
needed products. Governmental assistance to private companies reached
a peak during the mid-nineteenth century with the financing of railroad
construction. Public reaction to abuses and improprieties involved
therein, however, led to the adoption of constitutional restrictions which
curtailed such activity in many states. While some governmental
financial assistance to industry continued into the twentieth century,
largely in the form of tax concessions,36 the next major development
occurred in 1936 when the Mississippi legislature enacted the Balance
Agriculture With Industry (BAWI) plan37 in order to stimulate a
balanced economic development of the state for the prospective general
welfare of its citizens.38 In essence, this plan gave municipalities the
authority to issue general obligation bonds for the purpose of financing
the construction of industrial facilities which would be leased to private
industries establishing or expanding operations in the area.3 9 This plan
and its variations gained popularity in the South and began proliferating
throughout the nation.
Today a substantial majority of states utilize some type of plan for
the lending of governmental financial assistance to industries. Generally,
five basic financing programs are in use today: (1) municipally owned
industrial plants financed through the issuance of bonds; (2) second
mortgage loans for industrial plant construction made from
appropriations of out of state revenues; (3) governmental insurance of
first mortgages; (4) bonds issued by local development corporations; and
(5) state and local jax exemptions and concessions.4 0 Each of these plans
has the same goals-to attract and keep basic industries by reducing
industrial costs, to provide funds to industrial concerns which could not
easily obtain financing through other means, to bring the potentials of
36. The tax exemption has managed to survive court scrutiny, even where a direct subsidy to
the industry, would be denied. It appears that a more liberal construction of "public purpose" has
been applied to tax exemptions-even though a tax exemption is an indirect subsidy-probably on
the theory that the power to tax (and the power to exempt from taxation) is inherent in the
government. Stimson, supra note 17, at 418-19.
37. Pinsky, supra note 7, at 266.
38. Miss. CODEANN. § 8936-51 (Supp. 1966).
39. MIss. CODE ANN. § 8936-52 to -61 (Supp. 1966).
40. Pinsky, supra note 7, at 266-72. See also Abbey, Municipal Industrial Development
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respective regions to the attention of business leaders, and to improve
4
regional images. '

B. Public FinancingPlans
1. The Bond Plans.-Perhapsthe most significant and widely
used financial assistance program is the municipal industrial
development bond plan. This plan was conceived by the Mississippi
legislature in 1936 as a response to the state's immediate and long-range
economic problems. Typical of these problems were acute

unemployment, low per capita income, and a failure to achieve regional

economic take-off. 42 Consequently, the entire economic situation called

for a program of economic stimulation. The legislative response to

these problems was the BAWl plan, which subsequently became the

model for financing plans enacted in areas similarly affected. Under the
BAWl plan any municipality was authorized to issue general obligation
bonds for the purpose of financing industrial plant construction. Once

constructed, the industrial facilities would be leased by the municipality
to private industrial enterprises as an inducement to locate or to expand

operations in the community. 3 Theoretically the rentals paid by the

industry under the terms of the lease would be sufficient to amortize the

bond issue.44 Consequently under the objectives of the BAWI plan, the
industry would obtain the benefit of low-cost facilities, the community
would receive the economic benefit of the industry, and the bondholders

would realize a return on their investment.
In 1938, however, the BAWl plan was challenged in Albritton v.

City of Winona,45 on the ground that it violated the public credit
requirements of the state constitution.4 6 The Supreme Court of
Bonds, 19 VAND. L. REV. 25 (1965); Bridges, State and Local Inducements for Industry (Part 1), 18
NAT'L TAX J. 1(1965); Stimson, supra note 17.
41. Bridges, State and Local lnducementsfor lndustry (Part II), 18 NAT'L TAX J. 175 (1965).
42. Pinsky, supra note 7, at 267.
43. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 8936-52 to -61 (Supp. 1966). The BAWl statute required approval
of any project by both the municipal electorate and by the state Agricultural and Industrial Board.
Board approval, after a substantial investigation into the economic feasibility of the project,
resulted in the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Pinsky, supra note 7, at
267.
44. Initially the rentals were set at nominal rates so that the BAWl plan amounted to direct
subsidization. Later the rental rates were raised so that amortization became possible. Id. See
generally Jones, Federal Income Tax Deductions of BA WI Leasehold Payments, 30 Miss. L.J. 10
(1958).
45. 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938). The case arose when a certificate of public convenience
and necessity was issued to the city authorizing the issuance of $35,000 of general obligation bonds
tb finance the acquisition of a knitting plant.
46. Id. at92, 178 So. at 801.
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Mississippi upheld the BAWl legislation on the theory that the overall
economic benefits accruing to the communities through increased
industrial activity promoted the general welfare of the state's citizens47
and, thus, constituted a public purpose.
Having passed its court test in Aibritton, the BAWl plan stimulated
considerable interest among other southern states experiencing economic

conditions similar to those of Mississippi. Although differing in form,

subsequent municipal industrial development bond financing plans were
similar to BAWl in theory and in purpose.48 During the 1950's such

plans became established in the South; but their real growth in national
popularity did not occur until the 1960's,4 9 when the proliferation of

industrial development bonds reached exponential proportions. It is
estimated that approximately forty states issued over one billion dollars

of bonds in 1967.50
Basically two types of bonds are utilized in municipal industrial
development bond financing-general obligation bonds and revenue

bonds. General obligation bonds are backed by the full faith and credit
of the community. As such, they are subject to payment out of tax or

general revenues and they represent debt obligations for which the
municipality is directly liable. 5 Revenue bonds, on the other hand, are
payable solely out of revenues derived from the project financed by their
issuance.5 They do not represent general debt obligations, have no claim
upon municipal revenues, and consequently are more compatible with

state constitutional restrictions on the lending of public credit.
Furthermore, revenue bonds may not be subject to state debt limitations

under the "special fund" doctrine. 53 As a result, they tend to be somewhat
47. Id. at 99, 178 So. at 805.
48. Some states, e.g., Kentucky, utilize only revenue bonds for industrial development
financing. Other states, e.g., Tennessee, utilize both general obligation and revenue bonds for such
purposes. See Abbey, supra note40, at 28-29, 69, 70.
49. In 1963, for example, approximately $400 million in industrial development bonds were
issued. Business Week, Dec. 14, 1963, at 49. For an indication of the increased use of such bonds
during the period 1951-63, see id. at 45.
50. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 1967, at 26, col. 1.For a compilation of the enabling
acts of most of these states, see Abbey, supra note 40, at 67-71.
51. E.g., Rivers v. City of Owensboro, 287 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Ky. 1956) (difference between
special assessment and general obligation bonds noted). All conceivable tax sources need not be
pledged, however. Walton v. Carter, 337 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Ky. 1960) ("Certain tax sources or
portions thereof may be excluded or excepted . . . still leaving under pledge the remainder of the
comprehensive taxing power.").
52. E.g., Zeigler v. Witherspoon, 49 N.W.2d 318, 325 (Mich. 1951) (credit of state not
pledged nor does taxpayer pay for facilities financed through revenue bonds).
53. "In many states, the state courts subscribe to the Special Fund doctrine which holds that
bonds serviced from special funds are not debts in the constitutional sense." Ratchford, Revenue
Bonds and Tax Immunity, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 40,41 (1954).
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more popular than general obligation bonds for industrial development

financing and are generally hampered with fewer issuance restrictions. 4
2.

The Pennsylvania Plan.-This type of industrial development

financing program was devised to remedy adverse employment
conditions that developed when labor surplus regions began to
materialize in areas where certain basic industries underwent extensive

modernization and automation.5 This plan involves the making of
second mortgage loans for plant construction. These loans are made by a

state Industrial Development Authority to local non-profit development
corporations established for this purpose in labor surplus areas. The

development corporations apply these funds to the construction of
industrial facilities, which are then leased to the participating industries
upon completion. 6 The first mortage funds, which often constitute the

major part of the financing, are obtained from private lending

institutions.17 Although the BAWl influence on this type of financing is
apparent, the interposition of the local development corporation was

designed to avoid state constitutional limitations on the direct lending of
the state's credit to private interests.58 Furthermore, the BAWl plan

contemplates complete financing through public means, whereas the
Pennsylvania plan encourages maximum participation from the private
sector. 9
3.

The New England Plan.-A plan similar to that of

Pennsylvania was developed in New England in an effort to revitalize
54. For example, the Tennessee enabling legislation requires agency approval before general
obligation bonds can be issued. No such requirement exists for revenue bonds. Compare TENN.
CODE ANN. § 6-2905 (Supp. 1968), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1705 (Supp. 1968). See U.S.
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND

FINANCING, Report A-18, at 47-51 (June 1963).
55. Pennsylvania, which devised this plan, experienced conditions of underemployment and
labor surplus during the post-World War I I period. The labor surplus areas developed primarily due
to the modernization of the steel and coal industries. In 1958, for example, Pennsylvania had more
than one-fourth of the areas classified as "chronic labor surplus" by the Department of Labor.
Davlin, State Development Corporations: The Pennsylvania Experience, 24 LAW & CONTEmP.
PROB. 89, 90 (1959).
56. The Pennsylvania Industrial Development Authority, for example, is "authorized to
make loans to industrial development agencies in an amount not in excess of 40% of a project cost in
areas of the Commonwealth having an average rate of unemployment of 6% or higher for any five
years of the preceding ten years and to make loans not in excess of 30% of a project cost in areas
having an average rate of unemployment of between 4% and 6% for any five years of the preceding
ten years." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 302.1 (Supp. 1967).
57. Pinsky, State ConstitutionalLimitations on Public IndustrialFinancing:An Historical
and Economic Approach, Ill U. PA. L. REV. 265, 270 (1963). The non-profit local development
corporation may also participate financially. Id.
58. E.g., PA. CONST., art. 9, §§ 6, 7.
59. Pinsky, supra note 57, at 27 1.
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weak economic sectors occasioned by the migration of various
industries, especially textiles, to other regions. 0 The New England plan
also approaches the problem of industrial development financing from
the standpoint of encouraging maximum participation by private
lending institutions. Essentially, this plan makes the state a first
mortgage guarantor, so that the full faith and credit of the state is
available to insure payments on mortgage loans totalling up to 90 per
cent of the cost of the new industrial facilities.' Such loans are obtained
from commercial financial institutions. 2 Where state constitutions
prohibit the use of state funds or credit to finance private projects, title to
the new industrial facilities is vested in local development corporations
which lease the plants to the participating industries.63 The remaining 10
per cent or so of the funding is often provided by the industries. These
funds are, however, often available on a second mortgage basis from
business development companies established to provide private financing
for industry when commercial banks are reluctant to assume the higher
risks involved.6 4 Characteristic of the New England plan is a high degree
of coordination and cooperation between public and private agencies.
4. Development Corporation Bond Plans.-A variant of the
BAWl plan utilizing local development corporations was enacted by
Alabama in 1949.65 Under this program, local development corporations
issue revenue bonds to finance the construction of industrial facilities
which, in turn, are leased to participating industries. The corporations
apply the rentals received to the amortization of the bonds 66 and any
remaining earnings are disbursed to the municipalities, since these
corporations are non-profit by legislative definition. 7 Once a local
development corporation is formed in accordance with the provisions of
the legislative enactment,68 it alone has the discretionary authority to
determine its own course of participation in industrial development
financing .69
60. Id. at 270-71 n.29.
61. Id. at 271. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-34-10(2) (Supp. 1967).
62. See, e.g., RHODE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, RHODE ISLAND

FINANCING

PLANS 6 (undated).
63.

E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-34-6 (Supp. 1967).

64. See, e.g.,

RHODE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, supra note 62, at 15.
65. Abbey, supra note 40, at 28.
66. The bonds may be secured by mortgages or trust deeds on the industrial facilities.
CODE tit. 37,-§ 824 (1958).

67.

ALA. CODE

ALA.

tit. 37, § 827 (1958).

68. ALA. CODE tit. 37, §§ 817-22 (1958).
69. The industrial development corporation needs no prior approval from state agencies or
from the municipal electorate in order to undertake industrial development financing projects, ALA.
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The Oklahoma industrial development financing plan, adopted in
1949,70 is also centered around the development corporation. Under the

Oklahoma plan a state industrial finance authority is empowered to sell
general obligation bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the state.
The funds thus obtained are loaned by the authority to local

development corporations. 7' The amount of such loans is limited to 25
per cent of the estimated cost of the project, and the local development

corporations must be able to show that they hold funds equal to an
additional 25 per cent of the estimated cost. This participation
requirement may be reduced pro tanto when the development

corporation has received from responsible commercial lending
institutions firm commitments of funds exceeding 50 per cent of the

estimated cost.72 However, the development corporation must have firm
commitments for all funds in excess of the loan from the state industrial

authority as a condition precedent to obtaining the loan.
5. Tax Exemptions and Concessions.-The history of tax
exemptions given to industry as a means of affording financial assistance
dates from the colonial period when property tax exemptions were
granted to certain manufacturing enterprises.74 Whenever it was deemed

advisable to encourage manufacturing-during war years or during
reconstruction periods, for example 7 -tax

exemptions, as well as

subsidies, were employed. Consequently, the history of tax exemptions is
directly related to the history of early economic development. 76
Since the power to tax is a power inherent in sovereign states, state

legislatures have the implied power to grant tax exemptions to industrial
enterprises, subject only to constitutional limitations on the exercise of
CODE tit. 37, § 822 (Supp. 1967), or to issue bonds therefor. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 823 (Supp. 1967).

See generally Abbey, supra note 40, at 28-29.
70. Pinsky, supra note 57, at 272.
71. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 856-60 (1965). The development corporation need not be
non-profit. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 853(d) (1965).
72. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 857(1)(A)(1)-(2) (1965) (Supp. 1968).
73. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 857(l)(A)(2) (Supp. 1968).
74. In 1649, Connecticut granted the first property tax exemption for commercial reasons.
Alyea, Property Tax Inducements to Attract Industry, in PROPERTY TAXATION USA 139, 140
(R.W. Lindholm ed. 1967). In 1783, Connecticut provided for a two-year exemption for the
manufacture of flax seed oil. Id.
75. Stimson is of the view that industrial tax exemption legislation proliferates during war
years. Stimson, The Exemption of Property From Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REV.
411, 417 (1934). Tax exemptions were equated with subsidies in the South after the Civil War.
"Anyone who employed capital in the manufacture of cotton, wool, or paper, fabrics, iron, lime or
agricultural implements was entitled to receive, from the state treasury, a subsidy equal to his total
state taxes (except the 2-mill school tax) for a period of ten years." Alyea, supra note 74, at 14 1.
76. Stimson, supra note 75, at 416-17.
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this power." At the discretion of the legislatures, this power may be

delegated to local governmental units. 78 Generally, statutory tax
exemptions are granted to new or expanding industrial enterprises for the

same economic purposes as those underlying other industrial
development programs. Once granted, tax exemptions cannot be

rescinded, unless forfeited,79 within the term of the exemption even
though the tax rate rises or an attempt is made to rescind by the
appropriate governmental unit. 0

Generally, tax exemptions fall into two categories: those authorized
by statutory enactments and those granted by negotiation without

legislative authorization. Thirteen states specifically authorize direct
property tax exemptions for new and expanded industrial facilities. 8'

These exemptions may be comprehensive, optional with the local
governments involved, or contractual with the participating industries. 2

Those states utilizing industrial development bond financing usually
provide for the exemption of the municipally-owned industrial facilities,
although this does not necessarily follow from municipal ownership

itself.83 twenty-four states either grant an exemption from or a reduction
of property taxes on business personal property." In addition, certain
77. Alyea, supra note 74, at 141; Stimson, supra note 75, at 418. See Duke Power Co. v. Bell,
156 S.C. 299, 309, 152 S.E. 865, 869 (1930), holding that "IT]he power of taxation is legislative
power, and knows no limitations, except those imposed expressly or by plain implication in the
State or Federal Constitutions."
78. See, e.g., Crow v. Gen. Cable Corp., 223 Ala. 611, 137 So. 657 (1931) (the legislative
power to exempt industrial plants from taxation may be delegated to local governmental units
absent constitutional restrictions).
79. Forfeiture may be accomplished by abandonment of the enterprise. E.g., Edison
Phonograph Co. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 55 N.J.L. 55, 25 A. 329 (1892) (active carrying on of
business within the state is an essential requirement for a tax exemption).
80. E.g., Rixford Mfg. Co. v. Highgate, 102 Vt. 1, 144 A. 680 (1929). The granting of the
exemption was viewed as a contract, the consideration being the establishment of industrial
operations in the area. Once the industry relied on the exemption by establishing operations, the
exemption could not be unilaterally rescinded.
81. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Vermont. A brief

description of each of these statutory provisions is provided in

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON

Report A30 (April 1967), at 109-10 [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY TAX REPORT]. See, e.g., R.I. GEN LAWS
§ 44-3-9 (Supp. 1967) (10 year exemption at discretion of municipality); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 651524-72 (1962) (5 year exemption not including school taxes, conditions varying with the counties);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3834 (1959) (10 year exemption at discretion of municipality).
82. Alyea, supra note 74, at 141. Some states, e.g., Vermont, give municipalities discretion to
grant exemptions to industry. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3834 (1959).
83. This exemption may be authorized by state constitutions under the public purpose
doctrine, or it may be authorized by statute. Absent such provisions, the facilities have still been
treated as tax exempt. Pinsky, supra note 57, at 319.
84. These states include: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida. Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCAL TAXATION AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION,
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property tax characteristics are such that they can amount to partial
exemptions, or, at least, to concessions favoring industry. Such
characteristics include: (1) favorable property tax classification; (2) low
effective rates in industrial areas; and (3) "long-term stability in assessed
valuation" causing, in effect, immutability of future tax bills." When the
tax structures of the states are considered in their entirety, including subrosa exemptions and concessions, there are few states which do not give
favorable tax treatment of some kind as an inducement to industrial
expansion. Although the total tax revenue lost through industrial
exemptions is not ascertainable due to insufficient data, a recent study
has estimated that an annual revenue loss of 40 million dollars results
from the exemption of approximately 3.6 billion dollars in industrial
property.86
C. A Comparisonof the Plans
The influence of the BAWL plan on the other methods of industrial
development financing is apparent, since other plans typically involve
long-term financial and contractual commitments for both industry and
government, with the dual objectives of stimulating regional economic
development while providing industry with needed capital. Manifest
differences are apparent, however, in scope and in application. For
example, the industrial development assistance programs of the various
states range from complete public financing of industrial projects, as in
the municipal bond plans, to encouragement of a high degree of private
participation, as in the New England and Oklahoma plans.
Furthermore, there is a wide variation in the degree of overall economic
planning, coordination, and supervision between state, local, and private
agencies. Those plans requiring a high degree of private financial
participation necessarily require close coordination between the various
interests involved, while those providing 100 per cent financing require
overall economic planning and supervision by state agencies. 7
Moreover, the states are not uniform in the application and supervision
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North

Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
ADVISORY TAX REPORT 107-08.

85.

Alyea, supra note 74, at 142. For a comprehensive analysis of state and local tax
policies
designed as inducements to industry, see ADVISORY TAX REPORT 43.
86. Bridges, supra note 40, at 9. Reasonably sufficient information is available for Alabama,
which has $77.8 million in assessed industrial exemptions resulting in an annual revenue loss of from
$0.5 to $1.0 million. ADVISORY TAX REPORT 47.
87. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-34-2 to -10 (Supp. 1967), with Miss. CODE ANN,
§ 8939-01 (Supp. 1967).
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of similar plans. Alabama, for example, allows local development
corporations wide discretion in determining their participation in industrial development projects, although 100 per cent financing is involved."
The size of the industry attracted to a region is influenced by the
type of financing plan employed by the area. Generally, the larger
industrial projects are apt to be financed by the municipal industrial
development bond method. 9 This type of financing is particularly
adapted to raising the large sums of money necessary to construct major
plant facilities. Consequently, blue chip companies with national
operations are more likely to use such financing. On the other hand, the
small-to-medium sized firm is better suited to the Pennsylvania or New
England plan, since, although the capacity of these plans to make funds
available on a large scale is somewhat limited, the mechanisms involved
are less cumbersome than the bond methods. Some states have enacted
more than one of the basic industrial development programs in an effort
to attract a wider range of industrial enterprises or to make their areas
more competitive by providing a choice in methods of plant financing.90
Pefhaps the most flexible method of providing financial assistance
to industry is the use of tax concessions and exemptions. Often
minicipalities are vested with discretionary control over the granting of
tax exemptions. 9' However, there are two reasons why exemptions may
not be as effective in stimulating economic growth as the more direct
forms of financial assistance. First, tax provisions granting exemptions
are premised on the ability of industry to provide its own capital for new
facilities; second, the economic benefits of tax exemptions are of
relatively short duration.92 When the exemption takes the form of an
exemption from property taxation, the amount of financial assistance
received by the industry is directly related to the value of the property
held by the industry rather than to its actual need. Thus, it is more
difficult to determine extent of economic benefit and its relation to
regional development when exemption plans are used.93
88.

ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 823 (Supp. 1967).
89. E.g., Missisippi made a $130 million bond issue to construct facilities to be leased to
Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp6ration. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1967, at 21, col. 1.
90. See, e.g., RHODE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, supra note 62, at 19, where

it is stated that Rhode Island's adoption of revenue bond financing in addition to its first mortgage
insurance plan was designed to serve a two-fold purpose: (1) to provide a choice in the methods of
plant financing, and (2) "to accommodate the blue chip customer who wished to build a multimillion dollar facility on the best possible terms." The first mortgage insurance plan had been par-

ticularly effective with small-to-medium sized industrial facilities.
91. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3834 (1959).
92. Generally, exemptions run from 2-10 years. See Alyea, supra note 74, at 142;
TAX REPORT 109-10.
93. Stimson, supra note 75, at 423-24.
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D. Legal Challengesto IndustrialDevelopment Financing
1. Historical Background.-Legal challenges to industrial
development financing were based upon the constitutional limitations
formulated during the nineteenth century era of rapid industrial
expansion. Generally those limitations assumed two basic forms:
prohibitions against the lending of credit by state governmental units to
private individuals or associations, and prohibitions against the holding
of stock in private corporations by such governmental units." Thus,
the nineteenth-century experience which gave rise to the public aid limitations
demonstrates that if public funds are to be risked, the risk must flow from public

rather than private decision. Adequate protection of the public financial interest
necessitates public control consonant with public financial risk."

A judicial doctrine analogous to, but distinct from, the early
constitutional limitations emerged in the nineteenth century and further
restrained governmental activity in the private financial sector. Under
this doctrine it was contended that taxes levied by state governmental
units must be used for public purposes.96 This "public purpose" doctrine
was first stated, by way of dictum, in Sharpless v. Mayor of
97 and was applied by the Supreme Court to the use of
Philadelphia
municipal bonds in the landmark case of Loan Association v. Topeka."
In the Loan Association case, the city donated 100 thousand dollars of
its municipal bonds to a private industrial corporation to encourage the
establishment of a manufacturing plant in Topeka. Since it would have
been necessary to levy taxes to pay the interest on the bonds, the Court
was faced squarely with a public purpose prbblem. Although no state or
federal constitutional provisions expressly prohibited the bond donation
in question, a majority99 of the Court viewed the public purpose criterion
as an inherent limitation on the power to tax.' 0 The Court recognized
94. Pinsky, supra note 57, at 278. See, e.g., MIss. CONST. art. 14, § 258, "The credit of the
state shall not be pledged or loaned in aid of any person, association, or corporation; and the state
... See also PA. CoNsT. art.
shall not become a stockholder in any corporation or association.
9, §§ 6, 7. Section 6.-"The credit of the Commonwealth shall not be pledged or loaned to any
individual, company, corporation or association, nor shall the Commonwealth become a joint
owner or stockholder in any company, association or corporation." Section 7.-"The General
Assembly shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township or incorporated district to
become a stockholder in any company, association or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate
money for or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution or individual."
95. Pinsky, supra note 57, at 281.
96.

97.
98.
99.
restricted
100.

Id.

21 Pa. 147 (1853).
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
Clifford, J., dissented on the grounds that no state or federal constitutional limitations
the activity under consideration. 87 U.S. at 667.
The majority reasoned that since a lawful taxing power is, by nature, unlimited in scope,
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that a definition of public purpose would be difficult to formulate, but it
was suggested that "the objects for which taxes have been customarily
and by long course of legislation levied [and] what objects or purposes
have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of
the government" would be highly persuasive.' 0'
While the Loan Association case signalled the adoption of the
public purpose doctrine by the Supreme Court, the decision was not
based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.,0 2
Incorporation of the public purpose doctrine into fourteenth amendment
substantive due process was not manifested until the later case of
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,' where special annual
assessments were levied on property located within irrigation- districts
formed pursuant to a California statute. The issue there was stated in
terms of the fourteenth amendment:
In the Fourteenth Amendment the provision regarding the taking of private
property is omitted, and the prohibition against the State is confined to its depriving
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. It is claimed,
however, that the citizen is deprived of his property without due process of law, if it
be taken by or under state authority for any other than a public use, either under the
guise of taxation or by the assumption of the right of eminent domain. In that way
the question whether private property has been taken for any other than a public use
becomes material in this court, even where the taking is under the authority of the
State instead of the Federal government.10'

In applying the public purpose criterion to the state enactment, the
Court upheld the statute on the ground that the public would be benefited
by the addition of productive sectors to the state.0 5 Considerable weight
was ,given by the Court to findings of public purpose by the California
courts," 6 suggesting a trend toward allowing the states to make their
own determinations of public purpose. This trend became apparent with
an unrestricted application of the taxing power for purposes not public in character would result in
unlimited government power. The federal system of government being one of limited powers
suggests inherent limitations in the area of taxation. "To lay with one hand the power of the
government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals
to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done
under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative
forms." 87 U.S. at 663-64.
101. 87U.S.at665.
102. McAllister points out that the opinion of Miller, J., in Loan Association did not
mention due process at all. McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 137, 147
(1930).
103. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
104. 164 U.S.at 158.
105. 164U.S. at 161.
106. 164 U.S. at 160.
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0 7 and Green
the decisions in Jones v. City of Portland'
v. Frazer.'8 In

both cases the Court, while recognizing that the public purpose criterion
was a fourteenth amendment due process requirement, acknowledged the

right of the states to make their own public purpose determinations and
indicated that such determinations were entitled to the highest respect." 9

These decisions suggest that state legislative and judicial determinations
of public purpose will be upheld if reasonably related to some public
benefit. As a result, the public purpose requirements of the fourteenth

amendment provide only broad overall limitations on state taxing and
spending power.
The public purpose doctrine has found widespread judicial approval

at the state level, ' 0 and in some states it has been translated into express

constitutional provisions."' In such states, the public purpose criterion is

likely to provide more specific limitations than the broad requirements
of due process as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The nature of the

public purpose test, however, is neither uniform nor clear. Some states
take a restrictive view of public purpose and require the primary benefit
of the public expenditures to accrue to the public," 2 while other more

liberal jurisdictions require no more than an incidental public benefit." 3
107. 245 U.S. 217 (1917) (challenge to enabling act authorizing a municipality to establish a
fuel yard for the purpose of selling fuel at cost to residents).
108. 253 U.S. 233 (1920) (bond issues authorized to finance business activities of a state
industrial commission).
109. The Jones decision recognized that the superior quality of information available to state
legislatures enables them to make informed decisions on public purpose. 245 U.S. at 22 1. The Green
decision, on the other hand, based its decision upholding the state action on presumptive validity,
stating: "When the constituted authority of the State undertakes to exert the taxing power, and the
question of the validity of its action is brought before this court, every presumption in its favor is
indulged, and only clear and demonstrated usurpation of power will authorize judicial interference
with legislative action." 253 U.S. at 239. See generally, Abbey, Municipal IndustrialDevelopment
Bonds, 19 VAND. L. REV. 25, 34 (1965).
110. E.g., Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952) (promotion of
public welfare is a public purpose); People ex rel. Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499 (187 1)
(railroads not a public purpose).
111. E.g., Ky. CONST. § 171, providing that "taxes shall be levied and collected for public
purposes only ....
"See also S.C. CoNsT. art. 8, § 3, providing that "the General Assembly shall
restrict the powers of cities and towns to levy taxes and assessments, to borrow money and to
contract debts, and no tax or assessment shall be levied or debt contracted except in pursuance of
law, for public purposes specified by law."
112. E.g., Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633 (1960) (main benefits must
accrue to the public); State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952) (every new business
'benefits the public to some extent, but is not conclusive of public purpose). Cf. Polanski v. Town of
Eagle Point, 30 Wis. 2d 507, 141 N.W.2d 281 (1966) (public purpose is a matter of law, not fact).
113. E.g., City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 Mich. 273, 144 N.W.2d 460 (1966) (promotion of
general public welfare); Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956) (existing economic
conditions determine public purpose); Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920
(1956) (significant balance of public advantages over disadvantages).
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Consequently, while the public purpose test has the advantage of
providing an overall limitation on the taxing and spending power of
governmental units, the scope of this limitation varies with different
jurisdictions and the economic conditions existing therein In the area of
industrial development financing the public purpose test has been used in
conjunction with constitutional restrictions to test the validity of
financing plans." 4 Where the constitutional credit limitations do not
apply, as for example, to loans financed from current revenues,"' the
public purpose test provides the only touchstone of validity.
2. The Albritton Case.-In tne legal challenge to the BAWI
program in Albritton v. City of Winona,"6 the Mississippi Supreme
Court was faced squarely with the issue of determining state
constitutional credit limitations.' 7 Although it had been generally
presumed by writers and commentators that the public purpose doctrine
would be violated per se by direct financial assistance, the lending of a
state's credit to private industrial corporations," 8 the court upheld the
constitutionality of the BAWL plan while purporting to recognize the
public purpose doctrine. To do so the court first had to satisfy the credit
clause limitation. This was accomplished by noting that the BAWl
drafters had authorized municipalities not only to own and lease
industrial facilities, but also to operate them." 9 The court reasoned that
if a municipality could constitutionally operate industrial enterprises, it
could contract with private interests to undertake the operations without
violating the credit limitations. The court then applied a broad public
purpose test to determine if municipal operation of industrial facilities
would be in the public interest. By analogizing the BAWl plan to state
ownership of convict farms, the court concluded that municipal
ownership and operation of industrial facilities could be a reasonable
114. Generally, financing plans are first tested by state constitutional limitations. If the plans
comport with these provisions, the public purpose test is applied. Where the plan fails to pass the
constitutional test, the public purpose question may never be reached. See Development Credit
Corp. of Md. v. McKean, 248 Md. 572, 237 A.2d 742 (Ct. App. Md. Feb. 6, 1968) (since act
clearly violated constitutional credit prohibitions, there was no need to make a public purpose determination). Cf. Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. App. Va. Jan. 15, 1968)
(even if there is a public purpose, everything done to further it is not necessarily a proper govern-

mental function).
115. Pinsky, State ConstitutionalLimitations on Public IndustrialFinancing:An Historical
and Economic Approach, Ill U. PA. L. REV. 265, 279 n.76 (1963).
116. 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938).
117. MIss. CONsT. art. 14, § 258. See note 94 supra.
118. E.g., 15 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 43.29-.30, at 516-20 (3d ed.

1950).
119. Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 98, 178 So. 799, 804 (1938). See also Pinsky,
supra note 115, at 294.
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means of accomplishing legitimate public objectives. 120 Given the
depressed economic conditions existing in Mississippi at the time, the
court determined that the public interest required the government to
provide for the general welfare by any means that the legislature deemed
prudent, the only limitation being "that the means chosen must not be so
far beyond the necessity of the case as to be an arbitrary exercise of
governmental power."' 12' Thus, the court had little difficulty with the
public purpose doctrine, since the BAWl act was carefully drafted to
incorporate such valid public purposes as the relief of unemployment
and the development of regional resources. 22 In holding that public
purpose did not mean public necessity, the court quoted from an earlier
Michigan case:
Necessity alone is not the test by which the limits of State authority in this direction
are to be defined, but a wise statesmanship must look beyond the expenditures which
are absolutely needful to the continued existence of organized government, and
embrace others which may tend to make that government subserve the general wellbeing of society, and advanci the present and prospective happiness and prosperity
of the people." 3

3. Subsequent Developments.-The BAWl legislation and the
Albritton case established general patterns which were followed in
subsequent industrial development legislation. One such pattern evident
in most programs is the interposition of legalistic devices to avoid the
application of constitutional limitations. In Albritton, the court relied
heavily on BAWI's authorization of municipal operation of industrial
facilities in finding that the plan conformed to the constitutional credit
limitation, 24 even though it was never anticipated that municipalities
would actually engage directly in manufacturing operations. The
utilization of local development corporations in the Pennsylvania," 5
New England, and Oklahoma plans is an example of the interposition of
a legal device which insulates public agencies from direct lending to
private interests. Another development from BAWl is an expansion of
the public purpose doctrine to accomodate economic stimulation. The
Albritton interpretation of the public purpose doctrine was necessarily
broad, allowing the legislature to find a public purpose whenever
120. Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 98, 178 So. 799, 804 (1938).
121., Id. at 99, 178 So. at 805.
122. Id. at 97, 178 So. at 804.
123. Id. at 99, 178 So. at 804, quoting Cooley, J., in People v. Township Bd. of Salem, 20
Mich. 452,4 Am. Rep. 400 (1870).
124. Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75,98-99, 178 So. 799,804 (1938).
125. The Pennsylvania plan is financed out of current revenues and, thus, does not come
within the credit limitations. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 308 (1960). See also Pinsky, supra note 115
at 301.
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economic or social conditions suggested a need for change.'26 Other
courts have adopted this approach on the theory that when the net public
benefit gained through private use of public credit promotes the general
welfare, a public purpose is promoted.'27 Courts deferring to legislative
wisdom concerning the definition of public purpose examine industrial
development financing plans only to determine if the means employed
will reasonably accomplish the stated purposes. 2 ' Where courts have thus
expanded the public purpose criterion, few, if any, effective restrictions
remain on industrial development financing plans that do not come
directly under the ambit of constitutional credit limitations.'2 9
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that those courts
purporting to adhere to the public purpose doctrine must find some
public justification for industrial development programs. Generally such
courts have based their decisions on the premise that financial assistance
to industry promotes the economic welfare of the community. 3 0 Some of
these courts have failed to inquire whether the plans were intended to
promote the basic industries or the service industries which might have
some effect on a public purpose determination.' 3 ' Moreover, these courts
have not recognized generally the non-economic effects of economic
stimulation through industrial promotion.' 32 A more pragmatic
approach is taken by those courts which leave the question of public
126. Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 99-100, 178 So. 799, 804-05 (1938).
127. E.g., Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633 (1960) (the main benefits accrue
to the public, although industry is incidentally benefited).
128. E.g., Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951). The court
there held that the statute in question must clearly contravene constitutional provisions before it
would be declared invalid. The court also found "incidental public benefit" from the promotion of
industry.
129. Revenue bonds, for example, are self-liquidating, have no claim on tax or general
revenues, and are not subject to debt limitations. Some courts have held that they do not constitute a
lending of the public credit, E.g., Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184, 131 N.W.2d 5
(1964) (a debt of the state must be created before constitutional provisions are contravened); Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956) (no municipal debt created by issuance of revenue bonds, hence no charge upon municipal credit is incurred).
130. E.g., Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956) (relief of unemployment);
Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952) (providing a local sales outlet for
local products); Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938) (relief of
unemployment). Cf. Polansky v. Town of Eagle Point, 30 Wis. 2d 507, 141 N.W.2d 281 (1966)
(public purpose is a matter of law, not fact). Contra, State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779
(Fla. 1952) (merits ofplan not relevant).
131. E.g., Miller v. Police Jury, 226 La. 8, 74 So. 2d 394 (1954) (milk processing); Newberry
v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952) (pine stump processing to cultivate local
markets).
132. The cout in Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956),
seemed to consider other than economic factors in applying a net gain test where advantages must
significantly outweigh disadvantages.
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purpose to the legislative drafters of industrial financing plans,
upholding them where the mechanisms devised reasonably relate to the
purposes and objectives stated therein."' One commentator has observed
that:
the only valid criterion would seem to be whether the expenditures are sufficiently
beneficial to the community as a whole to justify governmental involvement; but
such a judgment is more appropriate for legislative than judicial action. The
judiciary should invalidate expenditures only where reasonable men could not differ
as to their lack of social utility.'

III.

FINANCING PLANS AND THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL STATE

A.

Regional Considerations

The net effect on a community or a region of economic stimulation
through the promotion of industrial development is difficult to
determine, since long-range interrelated economic, political, and social
effects are involved." 5 Predictions concerning these effects will likely
influence the type of financing plans adopted by state legislatures and the
kind of industries selected for participation in industrial development
programs. It seems mandatory, then, that certain economic, political,
and social factors be carefully considered before any community or
region undertakes to accomplish economic stimulation through
comprehensive industrial development programs.
Since a net benefit to the community is the primary goal of
industrial development financing, the initial inquiry should be "whether
the proposed project will augment the community's total value
position."' 36 Thus, at this stage a minimum inquiry would include the
economic needs of the community and its regional employment
multiplier, 3 7 the likelihood of the success of the proposed project, the
probable effects on presently existing local industries, local labor
conditions, and the impact on the existing facilities of the community.'38
133. See note 128 supra.
134. Note, Incentives to Industrial Relocation: The Municipal Industrial Bond Plans, 66
HARV. L. REV. 898, 903 (1953).

135. The values of the community and its long-range goals may be influenced by the types of
workers employed by the industry and immigrating to the community. The receptiveness of the
community to the particular types of basic industry should be evaluated to avoid potential
psychological tensions. See Cumberland & Van Beek, supra note 28, at 261. Seealso E. WHITMAN &
A CASE HISTORY OF A MOVE 47 (1966).
Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal FinancingJar Industrial Development, 70

W. SCHMIDT, PLANT RELOCATION:

136.

YALE L.J. 789, 796 (1961).
137. The regional employment multiplier would suggest the number of basic industry workers
r~quired to raise total employment to the desired level. See note 26, supra.
138. Note, supra note 136, at 796.
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Additionally, the incoming industry should be carefully selected on the
basis of comprehensive criteria. Factors to be considered are the nature
of the industry's products, 31 9 the technical sophistication of the
industry, 4 ' financial stability, employee wage rate levels,14 ' potential
142
utilization of local raw materials and products, corporate structure,
and the potential ability of the industry to exert political and economic

pressure on the community. 43
B.

IndustrialConsiderations

From the standpoint of industries considering the use of industrial
development financing, the business investment decisions involved

require exhaustive studies to determine the interrelation and relative
importance of many factors. The availability of governmental financial

inducements is only one factor, albeit an important one, which must be
considered before a final decision is reached on the location of new or

expanded industrial operations.
Generally speaking, industrial location decisions are influenced by
the variable cost elements in the price of the industrial product. Regional
factors which reduce certain variable cost elements are likely to carry
considerable weight when the relative advantages of one region over

another are evaluated. Basically the industrial manufacturing process
can be considered as involving four stages, each of which has a direct
relation to the cost elements: (1) obtaining the plant site, the plant, and
the machinery necessary for production; (2) obtaining raw materials,
electric power, and fuel; (3) selecting a labor force and establishing the
139. The products produced by the industry would determine their marketability outside of
the region.
140. A process of inductive retardation could occur where rapid technological changes are
occurring in some industries but not in others. The technologically stagnant industries can check the
growth of those achieving technological sophistication, thus retarding the overall economic growth.
A. GOURVITCH, A SURVEY OF ECONOMIC THEORY ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE & E.MPLOYMENT
231 (1966). See generally, J. K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 11-21 (1967).
141. Psychological tensions could increase if there is a substantial difference between the
average wage rate of the industry's employees and the median income of the community. See
Cumberland & Van Beek, supra note 28, at 261.
142. The industry may attempt to "insulate" itself from breach of contract or lease liability
by incorporating the new facility separate from other holdings." Note, supra note 136, at
801.
143. Id. Once a community has grown up around a particular basic industry, the economy of
the community may become largely dependent upon the industry. Such dependence makes the
community subject to pressure through industry threats to pull out or reduce operations. If the
industry has other plants capable of absorbing the capacity of the local plant, the industry may be
tempted to use its superior position to control community affairs, especially those affairs relating to
the industry.
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manufacturing process; and (4) shipping the finished products to
markets. 144 Each of these stages of production has cost elements which
may be fixed or variable with respect to the regional location of the
plant. Absent any governmental financial inducements, variable cost
elements occur in stages (2), (3), and (4), while the cost elements in stage
4
(1) are relatively constant regardless of geographic location.1 1
Consequently, in a model situation where there are no governmental
financial inducements and social factors are not considered, the primary
factors influencing industrial location are: (1) the availability of desired
raw materials, electric power, fuel and water; (2) the potential labor
force; and (3) the accessibility to markets through convenient
transportation facilities.Y When financial inducements in the form of
industrial development financing plans are made available, the cost
elements associated with obtaining plant facilities become variable in
direct relation to the type of inducements offered. Thus, a fourth variable
is introduced into the decisional process.
In addition to evaluating the economic importance of the plant cost
variable in light of possible financial inducements, industries should
undertake exhaustive studies of the basic purposes underlying the
inducements, since industrial development financing may be the result of
an effort to compensate for serious regional environmental
shortcomings.4 7 Such deficiencies may be of minor importance to a
particular industrial enterprise, but their existence should be known and
their effects investigated. If a regional area seeks to develop its potential
through industrial development financing, it may be advantageous for
industry to participate; on the other hand, if the region is attempting to
offset serious permanent deficiencies by such financing, it may be
prudent for a particular industry to seek capital through other means or
in other areas.
The variable elements of cost in the price of an industrial product
will likely determine the tentative selection of a region as an area of
144. "In each of these steps a certain expenditure of natural resources and labor is invested.
Each of these expenditures precipitates itself into the price which is secured for the product on the
market." ALFRED WEBER'S THEORY OF THE LOCATION OF INDUSTRIES 25 (C. Friedrich ed. 1929).
145. Id. at 30-34.
146. Note, Legal Limitations on Public Inducements to IndustrialLocation, 59 COLum. L.
REV. 618 (1959). Cost elements included in these factors are: utility costs, wage rates,
unemployment insurance costs, and transportation rates. See E. WHITMAN & W. SCHMIDT, supra

note 135, at 41. See generally J.
SMALL MANUFACTURING

Q9 61).
147.

THOMPSON, METHODS OF PLANT SITE SELECTION AVAILABLE TO
FIRMS, RESEARCH REPORT TO THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Prior to the widespread use of industrial development financing, the mere fact that a

community offered this inducement suggested that such shortcomings existed. See Note, supra
note 146, at 619.
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potential location. Once this tentative selection has been made, however,
other factors are often considered in an effort to obtain a better

understanding of communities within the area and their industrial
potentials. Inquiries are often made to determine the availability of

social overhead capital'48 and the attitudes of communities toward
industrialization.'4 9 Communities utilizing industrial development

financing plans in which a significant degree of discretion is vested in the
community planners can be expected to be receptive to industrial
location. Such communities, however, may have a scarcity of skilled

labor and inadequate social overhead capital with little potential for
developing either. 5
C.

Problem Areas

In addition to the economic and social considerations faced by both

the regions utilizing industrial development financing and potential
participating industries, there are a number of legal, financial, and

governmental problems which go beyond the public purpose and public
credit limitations discussed earlier. These problems are most apparent
with respect to the bond programs, but they also exist with the related

types of financing.
1. Legal Problems.-Perhapsthe chief legal problems arising with

industrial development bond financing are those created in the event of a
default on a particular bond issue. Although a bond issue is likely to be
secured by a mortgage on the industrial property, 5 ' it may be possible

for bondholders to hold the issuing municipality liable for any
deficiencies over the proceeds realized from the mortgage. Since general

obligation bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of the issuer, the
bondholders hold debt obligations of the municipality, and tax or other
148. Social overhead capital includes transportation, educational, recreational, and other
municipal facilities. See W. ROSTOw, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 19 (1960).
149. The attitude of the local citizens has an important bearing on the assimilation of the
industry into the area. An industry contemplating a move will likely inquire as to the desire of
employable persons to work in the plant, the status of labor and race relations, the feelings of older
residents toward industrialization, the effect of new industry on existing wage rates, and the
availability of skilled labor. E. WHITMAN & W. SCHMIDT, supra note 135, at 47-48. See generally
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 26, 1956, at 109.
150. Even with economic stimulation, very small communities are not likely to develop
adequate social overhead capital. For example, the town of Lewisport, Kentucky, (population - 600)
undertook a $50 million industrial development project financed by revenue bonds. The facilities
were to be leased to a major aluminum company which expected to produce approximately 60,000
tons of finished aluminum yearly from the plant. Such an operation would likely entail the
utilization of social overhead capital and skilled labor beyond the capacity of such a small
community to produce. See BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 14, 1963, at 4549.
151. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 824 (1940); MISS. CODE ANN. § 8936-960 (Supp. 1966).
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general revenues can be reached to discharge these obligations.'5 2

Revenue bonds, on the other hand, are not charged against the general
credit of the community and, in theory, the bondholders are restricted by
the bond contract to claims against the revenues obtained from the lease

between the industrial concern and the municipality.'

3 The

municipality

could, however, become directly liable to revenue bond holders under the

theories of: (1) misrepresentation, (2) negligence in issuance, (3) breach
of implied covenant, warranty or good faith, or (4) breach of trust., 4
Since these theories imply a gross misuse of the power to issue revenue
bonds, a strong case against the municipality would be necessary before
recovery would be allowed. Nevertheless, such theories are available, and

bondholder plaintiffs, with the benefit of hindsight, may be able to
persuade some courts to assess liability against the municipality in
accordance with one or more of these theories.'

A problem which exists for all of the plans where either the
municipality or a local development corporation is required to hold legal
title to the industrial property is the securing of a suitable industrial site.
The availability of such sites is not likely to pose a significant problem in
most small communities where underdeveloped areas are located in
quantity nearby. However, if the owner of a particularly desirable

industrial site refuses to sell or the legal title is fractionalized among
multiple owners, it may be necessary or desirable to employ eminent
domain to acquire the site.'56 The extent to which eminent domain may
be used depends, in part, on the "public use" requirement. There are two
views as to the requirements constituting "public use." The restrictive

view characterizes "use" as utilization or control, which has been
interpreted to mean that the public must "actually have some right to use
152. Armstrong, "Municipal Inducements"-The New Mexico Commercial and Industrial
Project Revenue Bond Act, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 58, 62 n. 19 (1960). It might not be necessary to reach
the tax and general revenues of the municipality, since, in case of default, the municipality would
have a cause of action against the breaching company and the damages assessed could be sufficient
to discharge the bonds. If the company were insolvent, however, the municipal revenues would be
reached.
153. Id.
154. ia. See also Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 395 (1942);
Note, supra note 136, at 793.
155. Armstrong, supra note 152, at 62. Due to the increasing use of municipal industrial bond
financing by established, blue chip corporations, defaults have become infrequent. As of 1963, no
issue involving a major corporation has defaulted, either as to principal or interest. ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND FINANCING,

Report A-18, at 51 (June 1963); BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 14, 1963, at 46. However, it may be too early
to say with assurance that major corporations will not default, since most industrial development
bond plans are less than ten years old.
156. Note, supra note 146, at 640.
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and enjoy the appropriated property, to command the services of the
occupiers, or to have a voice in the control and management of the
property."' 57 Clearly, under-this view use of eminent domain to acquire
industrial sites is not authorized. A more liberal view interprets public
use as requiring only a public benefit.'5 8 Under this view, eminent
domain would seem to be available for the acquisition of industrial sites
on the theory of public benefit through economic stimulation. However,
eminent domain under this view has been used sparingly-only where
there has been a special benefit associated with the condemnation.'59
Some states have avoided potential problems in this area either by
expressly authorizing or prohibiting the use of eminent domain in the
industrial development legislation.' 0
2. Tax Problems.-State and local tax problems center around
the potential erosion of local tax bases caused either by the absorption of
industrial property into public ownership or the granting of tax
exemptions to normally taxable sectors.' 6 ' It is at least arguable that
economic stimulation occasioned by industrial utilization of tax exempt
facilities more than offsets the loss of tax revenue as a consequence of
increased tax collections from improved property in the service industry
sector. Such effects are subject to speculation, however, and
consequently require careful evaluation by the economic planners of the
community. Tax and fiscal discrepancies may arise among various
regions within a state if the tax exemptions granted by one region have
significant effects in another. Thus, when a community contemplates
public ownership of industrial facilities or the offering of property tax
inducements, an effort should be made to insure that most of the benefits
62
are secured by that region.
157. Id. at 641. Under this view, use by the entire public is not essential. A common use is
required, however, if the locality is restricted. Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1965)

(eminent domain sought for an integrated port development and industrial park program). See also
I J. LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN § 258 (3d ed. 1909).
158. Note, supra note 146, at 641.
159. Such projects would include land reclamation, development of natural resources, and
slum clearance. See id. at 641-42; N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1959, at 1,col. 7.
160. Since eminent domain is a sovereign right, it may be exercised only by authority of the
state. I NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.14, 3.22 (3d ed. 1950). Some states authorize the use of
eminent domain to acquire industrial sites. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 58.140 (Baldwin 1963); Miss
CODE ANN. § 8936-09 (Supp. 1966). Others restrict such acquisitions to purchase, lease and gift.
E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 511(22) (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-74-4 (Smith-Hurd
1962).
161. See Westmeyer, Industrial Bond Controvery Boils, NATIONAL Civic REVIEW, June
1964, at 329-30.
162. Walker, Fiscal ConsiderationsInvolved in Patterns of IndustrialDevelopment, 31 TAX
POLICY 3,4-6 (March 1964).
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Of primary concern to the federal government is the misuse of the
federal tax exemption under section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code
through issuance of municipal industrial development bonds. Since
section 103 exempts interest earned on the obligations of a state or its
subdivisions, a typical abuse of this feature would involve the purchase
of a substantial portion of the bond issue by the company invited to lease
the industrial facilities. Under this scheme the company would enjoy a
double tax advantage, since it would be receiving tax exempt income in
the form of interest on its municipal bond holdings while taking expense
deductions for rentals paid to the municipality for the purpose of
amortizing the bond issue. Section 162(a)(3) of the Code curbs this
possible abuse to the extent that expense deductions for rentals are not
allowed if the company takes title to or acquires an equity in the
premises. 63
In addition to potential misuse of the federal tax exemption, a
further problem arises because, in effect, federal funds are being used,
through the tax exemption, to finance industrial development, while the
control of these funds rests entirely with the respective local
governments.164 Moreover, the diversion of normally taxable funds into
tax-exempt municipal bonds used to finance private industry causes an
erosion of the federal tax base directly proportional to the dollar volume
65
of bonds issued.
An interesting inconsistency becomes apparent when revenue bonds
are used for industrial development. To come within the tax immunity
provisions of section 103, it must be shown that the bonds are the
obligations of a state or its subdivisions. Yet, to escape state statutory
debt limitations such bonds are not viewed as obligations of these
governmental units. 66 Thus, for federal tax purposes industrial
163. But see Gem, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Miss. 1961), where the
rental deduction was allowed even though the lease provided for successive renewals at nominal
rentals. This suggests a method of avoiding the full effect of § 162(a)(3).
164. Note, Local IndustrialDevelopment Bond Financing,7 B.C. IND. & CoMi. L. Rev. 696,
700 (1965-66).
165. Id. Although it may appear that increased economic activity induced by the industry
would cause a broadening of the federal tax base which would more than offset the tax base erosion
due to the issuance of tax exempt bonds, this would be true only where an industry is induced to

establish new or expanded operations which would be postponed if bond financing were not
available. Otherwise, where industry is merely relocating, a net federal tax base erosion is likely,

since the economic stimulation in the new area would be compensated by an economic decline in the
old area of operations.
166. See Ratchford, Revenue Bonds and Tax Immunity, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 40, 42 (1954).
Furthermore, as Ratchford suggests, "the primary purpose of tax imniunity is to protect the
existence and the essential functions of states. . . .[]f a given function is not sufficiently important

to justify a state in assuming financial responsibility for it, the state is in a weak position to ask the

1968]

NOTES

development revenue bonds are viewed as debt obligations while for state

purposes they are not. As a result, revenue bonds are more vulnerable to
attack in the area of federal tax reform, the main thrust of which has

been toward removing or curtailing the tax exemption.'67
3. Economic and Financial Problems.-Whenever economic
stimulation is attempted through public industrial development

inducements, economic and financial problems can be anticipated. One
of the main financial problems is created by competitive advantage held

by industries participating in'public financing programs over industries
which do not utilize or cannot obtain such financing.'68 By not having to
use their own capital or credit to modernize, relocate, or expand their

operations, participating industries enjoy an advantage over competitors
and can obtain the benefit of capital at a lower cost than industries

issuing their own securities.'69 The increased use of industrial
development financing by major corporations financially able to obtain
their own capital'

indicates that such advantages are of more than

incidental interest to industry.
Overextension of credit is a major problem faced by relatively small

communities which undertake large industrial projects. The problem is
most acute where the industrial development bond method of financing

is employed. When general obligation bonds are involved, default of the
bond issue could seriously impair the financial stability of the
municipality. Even when revenue bonds are utilized the credit of the

community would be adversely affected by any defaulting issues, since
any future attempts to borrow funds for other purposes would be viewed
federal government to subsidize that function by exempting from taxation the interest on the bonds
issued to finance it." Id. at 43.
167. Treasury Secretary Fowler has indicated his disapproval of the tax exempt feature of
industrial development bonds. The Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1966, at 22, col. 3. Bills have been
introduced in Congress to this effect, but without much success. E.g., H.R. 517, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963); H.R. 11645, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Treasury Department has indicated that
it would support such measures in the second session of the 90th Congress, The Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 25, 1968, at 18, col. 3, and a bill rider which would remove the tax exemption from industrial
development bonds effective January 1. 1969, has passed the Senate during this session. The Wall
Street Journal, March 29, 1968, at 14, col. 1. The bill, as H.R. 18529, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968), is
presently in the House Ways and Means Committee.
168. See CHEMICAL WEEK, Aug. 17, 1963, at 88.
169. See id.
170. The largest issue ever sold for a single industry is Mississippi's $130 million industrial
development bond issue for the construction of shipbuilding facilities at Pascagoula, Mississippi.
The facilities are to be leased to Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation, a subsidiary of Litton Industries.
The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1967, at 21, col. 1. Other recent large issues include an $82.5
million issue by Middletown, Ohio, to finance the building of a mill for Armco Steel Corporation,
and a $75 million issue by Crossett, Arkansas, to expand facilities for Georgia-Pacific Corporation.
The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 1967, at 26, col. 1, 2.
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with extreme caution by lenders and investors.' The overextension of
credit problem is faced to a lesser degree by regions employing either the
New England or Oklahoma plans.' The Pennsylvania plan avoids the
problem by making industrial loans out of current revenues.
From the standpoint of the investor contemplating the purchase
of industrial development revenue bonds, the financial structure of the
participating industry is an important consideration, since, in effect, the
investor is asked by the issuing municipality to provide risk capital for
the industrial enterprise. The success of the industry in the community
laigely determines whether bondholder investors will realize a return on
their investments. Since municipal liability in case of default must be
based on tenuous theories, 7 1 there is little to protect investors from the
consequences of ill-advised revenue bond industrial development
projects. The Securities and Exchange Commission has approached this
problem by requiring full disclosure of the company's lease obligations
and its obligation to pay off the bonds, since the investor "is in reality
purchasing an interest in the lease obligation of the private company."'7
In proposing rules to make such disclosures mandatory on the
participating industries, the Securities Exchange Commission is seeking
to "enable investors to make informed investment judgments""' with
respect to these bonds.
The growing popularity of industrial development financing plans
suggests that a competitive aspect may be influencing regions to increase
the attractiveness of their plans as a defensive measure. From a financial
standpoint, this increasing attractiveness of industrial development
financing directed toward'major manufacturing enterprises could tend to
squeeze out smaller industrial concerns having a greater financial need of
such assistance. For example, the success of a municipal bond issue may
depend upon the financial position of the participating industry, since it
may be difficult, if not impossible, to sell bond issues where the
participating industries are not of blue chip stature. 7 6 The proposed
Securities and Exchange Commission regulations would tend to aggra171. See Ratchford, supra note 166, at 46.
172. Both the New England plan and the Oklahoma plan involve the state's credit. The New
England plan involves a pledge of the state's credit to insure payments on mortgage loans, while the
Oklahoma plan involves the use of general obligation bonds by local development corporations. See
text accompanying notes 60-73, supra.
173. See text accompanying note 154, supra.
174. The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 1968, at 9, col. 2,
175. Id.
176. See generally BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 14, 1963, at 45.
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vate this potential situation by emphasizing financial position rather than
the economic needs of both the-industry and the community.'77
4. Governmental Problems.-One of the major problems in the
area of industrial development financing is the degree of participation by
governmental units in private industrial undertakings. With the
exponential growth of industrial development financing more industrial
facilities are coming into governmental ownership, raising the fear that
industry will be taken over by state and local governments.' 78 Such
ownership, it is contended, violates traditional principles of free
enterprise and endangers the economic system by causing economic
dislocations through the introduction of artificial criteria in the location
of industrial and economic activity. 17 9 These problems are at least
partially allayed when governmental ownership is viewed as a temporary
measure and the governmental activities are seen as administrative
functions designed only to insure proper functioning of the financing
programs. Problems persist, however, due to governmental excesses and
abuses. The competitive nature of industrial development financing has
led to charges of "industrial piracy" by non-participating regions which
have -seen some of their industry migrate to other areas.8 0 That
retaliatory measures have been adopted by these regions is indicated by
the phenomenal growth in popularity of financing plans. Such regional
competition could intensify and, thus, destroy the purposes for which the
financing plans were created. The possible expansion. of industrial
facilities beyond the long-range economic needs of the area and the
utilization of such plans to finance facilities that are not industrial in
nature suggest other problem areas. 8 '
D.

Opposition

Industrial development financing has been opposed by various
financial, economic, labor, legal, and governmental spokesmen' 82
177. The basic policy behind the Securities Act of 1933 is to insure adequate disclosures are
made to investors so that informed investment decisions can be made. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
178. For a general listing of .arguments both for and against the use of industrial aid
financing, see Reilly, IndustrialAid Financing:Pro and Con Arguments, The Commercial and
Financial Chronicle, Apr. 29, 1965, at 34, col. 2.
179. Westmeyer, supra note 161, at 330.
180. Note, supra note 164.
181. rd. See Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966), for a case where
approval was sought for a bond issue, secured by pledges of certain tax revenues, for the
construction of facilities to be leased to the corporate owner of the Pittsburgh Pirates baseball team.
Approval was denied.
182. E.g., the Investment Bankers Association, the AFL-CIO, the Municipal Division of the
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generally on the grounds that the legal, financial, and governmental
problems associated with such financing outweigh the benefits to be
gained therefrom. Perhaps the most militant opposition has come from
the Investment Bankers Association. Since 1951 it has continuously
opposed municipal industrial aid financing. In that year the IBA
adopted a resolution calling for its members to exercise extreme caution
in underwriting and otherwise dealing with municipal industrial
development bonds and to inform various legislators and other interested
parties about the inherent dangers of such financing. 83' The specific
grounds given as justification for the resolution were an acute concern
for the injurious effects on public credit and the possible threats to the
American system of free enterprise and federal system of government.'84
A recent letter to American business from the IBA'83 broadly stated the
grounds for its opposition as violations of "principle and good
government."'8 6 In April, 1966, the IBA wrote to all United States
Senators and Representatives urging that they support legislation which
would make municipal industrial development bond financing
unlawful.'87 Notwithstanding the opposition of the IBA as a group,
prominent IBA members have continued to participate in the sale of
municipal industrial development bonds.'88
The adverse position of organized labor can be traced to a pattern
of industrial migration from highly unionized regions to other areas,
largely in the South, where conditions were less favorable to organized
labor. Labor has long suspected that industrial enterprises deliberately
attempt to locate in low wage areas or in states having "right to work"
laws.'89 At least one company has openly admitted that its decision to
locate a new plant in the South was influenced, in part, by the recipient
state's favorable labor laws.'8 0 Consequently, industrial financing plans
and tax exemptions, when coupled with "right to work" laws, could
make certain areas substantially more attractive to industrial concerns
American Bar Association, the Association of Municipal Finance Officers, the United States
Chamber of Commerce, and various individual economists and industry leaders. Cumberland &
Van Beek, supra note 135, at 254; BusINESS WEEK, Dec. 14, 1963, at 45.
183. Reilly, supra note 178, at 16, col. I.
184. Id.
185. The letter was sent to 500 of the largest industrial concerns in the United States. 47
PLBLIC MANAGEMENT.Jan. 1965, at 16.
186. Id.
187. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Aug. II, 1966, at 12, col. I.
188. E.g.. the Chase Manhattan Bank, which purchased Mississippi's $130 million bond issue
for the I ngalls Shipbuilding facilities. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 1967, at 26, col. 2.
189. Note, supra note 146, at 618 n.6.
190. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT. Oct. 26, 1956, at 108.
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seeking new regions in which to locate. Since southern states often offer
such a combination, labor views financial inducements to industry as an
ultimate threat to union power. 9'
Individual economists and industrialists have voiced some criticism
of industrial development financing on both philosophical and
pragmatic grounds. The main thrust of their criticism has been directed
toward the bond type of financing, since it entails the maximum degree
of governmental involvement in private industrial financing. From a
philosophical standpoint such spokesmen are "opposed to government,
being in any enterprise in which private business can handle itself
adequately."' 92 The tight credit situation has furnished a more practical
ground for opposition. Tight credit indicates that commercial lending
institutions are less willing to loan money to finance industrial
improvements, with the result that industrial enterprises are likely to
turn to the public sector for financing. This stimulus to municipal
industrial development bonds is likely to "place serious pressures on the
municipal bond market itself," which could result in higher municipal
bond rates generally. 93
Mounting criticism has developed in the federal government
concerning state and local tax exemptions to industry. The Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations voiced this criticism in a
recent feport studying the influence of state and local tax policies in
industrial location.' 9' The crux of the commission's criticism is that tax
exemptions and concessions to industry "can have baneful effects on our
Federal system by setting in motion a self-defeating cycle of competitive
tax undercuttings and irrational discriminations among business
firms."' 95 These effects, the commission concluded, occur primarily at
the local level, since the influence of tax exemptions on industrial
location increases "as the location process narrows down to a particular
jurisdiction within a region."' 96 Thus, it appears that this criticism is
191. Cumberland & Van Beek, Regional Economic Development Objectives and
Subsidizationof Local Industry. 43 LAND EcON. 253, 254 (1967).
192. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 1967, at 26, col. 3.
193. Id. at col. 2.

194.

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCALTAXATION

AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION, Report A-30 (April 1967) (hereinafter cited as ADVISORY TAX
REPORT). See also The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 10, 1967, at 9, col. 2.
195. ADVISORY TAX REPORT 83 (Recommendation No. 4). The Commission pointed to the
Louisiana Council on New Industry as an illustration of its recommendation. The Council is
authorized to "negotiate contracts with manufacturers which in effect will allow Louisiana to meet
the best (lowest) tax offer of any other state in which a manufacturer contemplates locating." Id. at

84.
196. ADVISORY TAX REPORT 78 (Finding No. 4). Similar conclusions have been reached by
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primarily levied at those states authorizing municipal discretion in
granting tax exemptions and concessions.
E. Relative Advantages and Disadvantagesof IndustrialDevelopment
FinancingPlans

The main advantage and primary purpose of all types of industrial
development financing is the economic stimulation of underdeveloped
areas. In theory, at least, the economic growth generated by new or
expanded industrial activity will be distributed and shared by the various
secondary growth sectors of the community through increased aggregate
personal income, retail sales, bank deposits, and tax revenues.197 Thus,
while the overall economic activity of the community will increase in
intensity and diversity, basic industrial enterprises obtain the benefit of
low-cost capital while participating in the development of the
community.
The financing plan best suited to the realization of these objectives
while minimizing potential problem areas depends upon the needs and
the capabilities of both the community and the industry. Each of the
financing programs has advantages which make it especially attractive
under certain conditions. As was suggested earlier, the bond plans are
particularly adaptable to large scale industrial financing involving major
corporations. Tax exemptions may also attract major corporations to
underdeveloped areas, but the financial benefits derived therefrom are
not immediately available to industries for plant construction purposes.
From an administrative standpoint, however, tax exemptions are easy to
confer and can be utilized to assist several local industries
simultaneously.
The mortgage insurance and development corporation loan plans
have the advantage of integrated participation by private lending
institutions. Governmental involvement is not as direct nor as massive as
in the bond or tax exemption programs. A high degree of coordination
and cooperation between governmental, financial, and industrial
interests is essential. Thus, under these plans financing is made available
to those small and medium sized enterprises which are potentially
overlooked by the other types of financing.
other commentators. "Industrial development inducements are a more important factor in the
choice of location within the region than in the choice of location of region." Bridges, State and
Local Inducements for Industry (Pait II), 18 NAT'L TAX J. 175, 183 (1965).
197. Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Financingfor Industrial Development, 70
YALE L.J. 789, 800-01 (1961). For a numerical study of the potential effects of new industry on a
community, see CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, WHAT NEW INDUSTRIAL JOBS
MEAN TO A COMMUNITY (1960).
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Each of the programs also has disadvantages and weaknesses.
While the bond plans are capable of raising large sums of capital, the
mechanisms involved are necessarily cumbersome. Voter approval,
certificates of convenience and necessity, and agency investigations may
all be required prior to the issuance of municipal bonds.'98 Consequently,
bond plans are unsuited to the simultaneous assistance of siAall, local
industries. Additionally, where adequate supervision of bond plans is not
a requirement, overextensions of credit and other abuses are potential
dangers. None of the direct assistance programs is completely
corhpatible with a free enterprise system, as is evidenced by the variety of
legalistic devices used to circumvent constitutional and judicial
limitations on state economic activity. None of these programs
minimizes the regional competition aspect of industrial development
financing. Tax exemptions are the most compatible with a free enterprise
economy, as is indicated by a long historical background; however, they
are open to abuse and to intense regional competition, especially when
controlled by municipal interests.
F.

Prognosis

The past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the utilization
of industrial development financing. New plans have been devised which
offer integrated programs of industrial financing ranging in scope from
mortgage insurance to complete bond financing. 99' The dramatic nature
of this growth may prove to be the undoing of these programs if regional
competition is allowed to obscure their original objectives. In addition to
an intensification of regional competition, the indiscriminate use of
industrial development financing could occasion a return to the status
quo existing prior to the advent of the BAW program through
stabilization of the plant construction cost variable to the point where it
no longer influences the choice of geographic plant location. This, in
turn, could precipitate the development of more ingenious and pervasive
financing programs to attract industry with the result that the free
enterprise system would be seriously imperiled. Before this point is
reached, however, corresponding pressures .are likely to influence
Congress to outlaw industrial development financing completely or, at
least, to curtail the tax exempt feature of industrial development
bonds. 00 Consequently, foresight, planning, and cooperation are essenE.g., MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 8936-52 to -58 (Supp. 1966).
E.g., Rhode Island. For a general description of the Rhode Island integrated plan, see
RHODE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL BUILDING AUTHORITY, RHODE ISLAND FINANCING PLANS (undated).
200. See Note, supra note 164, at 701; Henderson, Financingof Industrial Development
198.
199.
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tial at all levels of government and by all interests concerned if economic
stimulation is to assist in achieving economic maturity in all sectors.
IV.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Planningand Supervision
There is much that can be done at the state level to insure that any
industrial financing plan will, in fact, promote the objective of economic
stimulation while reducing risks, minimizing problems, and
safeguarding against abuses. It should be the duty of the state, through
statutory standards strictly observed and enforced by state agencies, to
effectuate the declared public policy of the state and to exercise overall
supervision of industrial financing consonant with the economic interests
of the communities, the state, and the nation. To obtain the necessary
background information for the intelligent administration of industrial
development financing, state agencies should undertake comprehensive
studies, through the use of professional analysts, to determine the longrange economic objectives of the state and its regions and the best
possible means of accomplishing these objectives. Mississippi, for
example, requires its Agricultural and Industry Board to undertake,
with competent professional assistance, a thorough study of markets,
products, and the industrial base necessary to supply the available
markets with the desired products."' Detailed cost estimates involving
facilities, labor, and operating costs are also prepared. 202 In this manner
the Agricultural and Industry Board is kept continuously informed of
the various economic conditions and needs of the state and its capacity
to support industry.
Community planners can also be of assistance in developing
standards and criteria for the administration of industrial development
projects. The degree of assistance needed from the community planners
will vary with the type of inducement offered, but close cooperation at
local and state levels is necessary to assure the efficient functioning of
any financial program. Before submitting a bond plan to a state agency
for approval, or before recommending that other inducements be offered
to encourage industrial activity, community planners should focus their
attention on the size and type of industry desired in the community. The
basic considerations discussed earlier could serve as a basis for an
by State and Local Governments, 63 BAYLOR Bus. STUDIES 18, 27-28 (1965).
201. MISS. CODE ANN. § 8939-01 (Supp. 1966).
202. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 8939-01(4) to (6) (Supp. 1966).
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evaluative study. Similar studies should be (and generally are)
undertaken by industrial concerns contemplating a move into a new
area.
Background investigations, evaluative studies, and close
cooperation are of little value if adequate statutory safeguards are not
incorporated into industrial financing legislation. These safeguards
should provide means of remedying each of the potential state and local
problems anticipated. For example, the problems of municipal liability,
eminent domain, and tax abuse should be specifically covered in bond
legislation. The risk of municipal liability could be reduced by requiring
state approval of bond plans," 3 by specifically authorizing or curtailing
eminent domain, and by minimizing tax abuse by prohibiting the sale of
industrial development bonds to participating industries.24 Similarly,
tax exemptions should be controlled at the state level to insure
uniformity and coordination throughout the state. In essence, statutory
safeguards for each of the programs are necessary to insure the proper
allocation of funds according to pre-established criteria.
B. Tax Reform
1. State and Local.-At the state level tax reform should center
on two main themes: (1) an evaluation and revision of local tax
structures with a view toward taxing those sectors directly related to the
program of economic stimulation; and (2) an integration of the state
program of tax exemption to achieve an orderly scheme of taxation
-commensurate with economic objectives. Where intelligent tax planning
is pursued, part of the money used to accomplish economic stimulation
can be recovered through tax revenues and made available for needed
social overhead capital. A program of general sales taxation, for
example, would talx the increased economic activity itself. As a result,
the funds made available would bear some relationship to the demands
on the public sector caused by economic growth. On the other hand, tax
203. If a reviewing agency is required to approve bond plans, the risk of a municipality
undertaking an ill-advised project is correspondingly reduced. Some states have established agencies
empowered to investigate and required to approve any municipal industrial development bond plan

before the community may proceed with the project. E.g., Miss. CODE

ANN.

§§ 8936-12, 8936-52

(Supp. 1966). Other states require agency approval only if general obligation bonds are to be issued.
E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2905 (Supp. 1968). In some instances the agency undertakes only a
limited investigation to ascertain if the proposed bond issue conforms to the provisions of the
enabling act, to determine if revenues derived will actually amortize the bond issue, and to determine
if the bond issue is sufficient or excessive for the scope of the proposed project. E.g., MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 5.3533(33) (Supp. 1968).
204. The mandatory redemption feature now being used under pressure from the Treasury
Department could be outlawed by such a provision. See note 211, infra.
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exemptions which do not contribute to economic growth in the primary

sector should be abolished in the absence of strong countervailing
factors.
2.

Federal.-Tax reform from the federal point of view is

concerned with the possible misuse of the federal income tax exemption
in the area of municipal bond financing. Several proposals have been

made to remedy the tax problems in this area, but three main proposals
have received primary attention:" 5 (1) amendment of section 103 of the
Internal Revenue Code to restrict the allowance of the federal tax

exemption in industrial financing situations;2"6 (2) the issuance of
delimiting rulings by the Treasury Department;201 and (3) the enactment

of uniform model state legislation.2 0
The most direct means, short of outright abolition of industrial
development bond financing by Congress, is the amendment of section
103. In general, proposed modifications have been of two -types-the
disallowance of rental expense deductions by participating companies
and the taxation of the interest paid by industrial development bonds. 9
It is submitted that another type of amendment could include

comprehensive criteria by which the tax exemption would be qualified.
Bond plans failing to meet such criteria would not receive tax exempt

treatment.
Rulings by the Internal Revenue Service and Regulations issued by
the Treasury Department serve as another means of alleviating tax

problems in this area. Liberal postures with respect to municipal bonds
in general have been reflected in past Rulings and Regulations.' Should
the Treasury Department desire to close the alleged loopholes presently

existing with respect to this type of industrial financing, it should
reevaluate its position as reflected through
Regulations.2 "

these Rulings

and

205. These proposals are set out in Note, supra note 164, at 696.
206. Id. at 702.
207. See id.; Spiegal, Financing Private Ventures With Tax Exempt Bonds: A Developing
"Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 224, 227-32 (1965).
208. This proposal was made by the Council of State Governments. Note, supra note 164,
at 696 n.7.
209. Id. at 702. A recent bill to remove the tax exemption from industrial development bonds
was introduced in the second session of the 90th Congress. This bill would accomplish a removal of
the tax exemption by excluding industrial development bonds from the category of "obligations"
described in § 103(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. H.R. 11645, 90th Cong., IstSess.
(1967).
210. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1-103-1 (1956), defining "obligation of' as used in § 103 as
meaning "obligations issued on behalf of" the political subdivision. See also Rev. Rul. 63-20, 19631 CuM. BULL. 24; Note, supra note 164, at 703.
211. The Treasury Department has recently indicated that it is considering issuing a ruling
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The proposal that the individual states enact uniform model
enabling legislation is the least likely to improve the existing situation.
While such legislation could be drafted containing satisfactory standards
and safeguards, it would be difficult to persuade all of the states to adopt
it. States already having industrial development bond enabling acts are
not likely to "act unilaterally since amending their own programs
without a guarantee that the other states will do the same runs too great
a risk of incurring a competitive disadvantage." '
V.

CONCLUSION

While the economic effects of industrial promotion are reasonably
predictable under the economic base theory of growth and development,
no clear conclusions have been reached concerning the effectiveness of
inducements on the location of industry."' Thus, once a region concludes
that it is essential for it to offer financial inducements to industry in an
effort to achieve economic stimulation, it becomes necessary to face the
difficult problem of determining the type of inducement which would
best effectuate these economic goals. Indicators for allocating funds and
establishing priorities among areas within a region can only suggest the
areas of greater growth potential. 4 Consequently, the type of programs
inaugurated by states and implemented by communities ar apt to be
determined by rather vague criteria concerning the effect of inducements
on industrial location. If the problem is approached from the standpoint
of reducing the plant cost variable, particular types of industry can be
attracted to an area with a greater degree of certainty, with the result
that long-range planning could be realized.
The increasing popularity of industrial development financing
suggests that there are considerable benefits to be gained from the
intelligent use of these plans. However, before a community commits
itself to a particular industrial development project it should develop a
clear concept of the direction in which the community is to move and it
which will eliminate the tax exemption on industrial development bonds. Janssen, IndustrialRevenue Bonds May Be Attacked By Treasury Ruling in Lieu of Legislation, The Wall Street
Journal, March 5, 1968, at 9, col. 2. This has prompted the issuance of bonds carrying a mandatory
redemption feature which will allow purchasers to sell their bonds to the participating corporations
if the tax exemption is removed. The Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1968, at 14, col. 2.
212. Note, supra note 164, at 704.
213. Bridges reached the conclusion that inducements can influence the volume and the
location of industrial investment. He also reached other general conclusions concerning the
importance of particular inducements on industrial location. Bridges, supra note 196, at 183-84.
214. See Stewart, RegionalAllocation of Public Fundsfor Economic Development, 43 LAND
ECON. 421, 433 (1967).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

['VOL. 22

should seek to define its long-range economic objectives in the context of
its ability to support industrial growth and its economic relation to other
regions. The states themselves can, with professional assistance,
undertake studies to define regional objectives; but statutory standards
implemented by state agencies are necessary to provide a framework
within which communities can plan to develop their economic potentials.
Legislation should be drafted with care to insure against potential abuses
and to prevent industrial development financing from becoming a means
of securing artificial competitive advantages which tend to "pirate"
industries from other regions. The federal government should consider
revision of its tax laws to curtail abuses, while authorizing plans used for
the legitimate purpose of intelligent economic stimulation. If the
economic effects of industrial development financing are thoroughly
evaluated by all interests concerned with a view toward achieving
economic maturity in all sectors, then the original objectives of the
programs-the promotion of the public welfare-may be realized.
EVERETT H. FALK

